Migration in Modern European History by Tilly, Charles
-I----------------------------------------- 
Migration in Modern European History 
Charles Tilly 
University of Michigan 
October 1976 
CRSO Working Paper #I45 Copies Available Through: 
The Center for Research on 
Social Organization 
The University of Michigan 
330 Packard !I214 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109 
MIGRATION I N  MODERN EUROPEAN HISTORY 
C h a r l e s  T i l l y  
U n i v e r s i t y  of Michigan 
O c t o b e r  1976 
What is 'Migration? 
1 
Some apparently crisp concepts owe their crispness to bureaucracy. 
After many centuries in which workers had now and then walked off the 
job to put pressure on the boss, only in the nineteenth century did firms, 
unions and governments coerce each other into precise definftions of the 
strike. Thenceforth the strike .routinized,.and strike statistics based 
on standard.definitions proliferated. Slowdowns, .wildcats, demonstrations, 
tardiness, absenteeism, unauthorized holidays; sabotage, mass resignation 
came to seem distinct alternatives to the strike. Most of the organized 
parties came to consider these other forms of action less desirable than 
the strike because they were riskier and less routine. Yet in the eight- 
eenth century the boundaries among these ways.of behaving had been unclear 
indeed. Bureaucracies defined the strike as a distinctive form of action. 
Bureaucracies helped create the modern strike. 
Other commonly employed and frequently statisticized concepts owe.the 
same debt to bureaucracy: unemployment, employment, production, consumption, 
perhaps marriage and,illegitimacy as well. Twenty-five years ago Oskar 
Morgenstern pointed out that fluttering definitions introduce significant 
errors into economic statistics. But Morgenstern thought the main problems 
were theoretical: 
There is often lack of definition or classification of the phenomenon 
to be measured or recorded, and in addition, there is the difficulty 
of applying correctly even a faultless system of classification. The 
theoretical characteristics of, say, anindustry or simply of a 
"price" are less well established than those of a wave length. Al- 
most everything turns around the question of classification. This is 
a w e l l  known d i f f i c u l t y  and much e f f o r t  h a s  b e e n ' d i r e c t e d  towards t h e  
es tab l i shment  .of uniform c^ la s s i f i ca t ions  , of employment c a t e g o r i e s  
and commodities i n  fo re ign  t r a d e .  But t h e r e  a r e  l a r g e  f i e l d s  where 
v e r y  l i t t l e  has  been done and where deep t h e o r e t i c a l  problems awaft 
s o l u t i o n  be fo re  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  can be  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  improved 
(Morgenstern 1963 : 35) . 
Morgenstern shows appropr i a t e  h id igna t ion  when faced  wi th  evidence t h a t  
o rgan iza t ions  a c t u a l l y  f a b r i c a t e  o r  manipulate  d e f i n i t i o n s  f o r  t h e i r  own 
purposes : 
Perhaps e q u a l l y  important  i s  t h e  o f t e n  a r b i t r a r y ,  w i l l f u l ,  and 
f r e q u e n t l y  policLcally determined procedure employed by customs of- 
f i c i a l s .  I n  s p i t e  of a  p e r f e c t l y  d e f i n i t e  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  scheme, 
commodities a r e  sometimes put  i n t o  a  s i m i l a r  ca tegory  c a r r y i n g  
h ighe r  d u t i e s  i n  o rde r  t o  impede t h e i r  import ( o r ,  a s  t h e  c a s e  may 
be,  i n t o  one t h a t  w i l l  make t h e  import cheape r ) .  This  p l a y s  havoc, 
of course ,  w i t h  s t a t i s t i c a l  accuracy (Morgenstern 1963: 37-38). 
Here is  a l e s s  t e s t y ,  b u t  more cyn ica l ,  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n :  bu reauc rac i e s  
f i r s t  produce d e f i n i t i o n s  t o  s e rve  t h e i r  own purpose. Economists come 
a long  later t o  r a t i o n a l i z e  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n s .  
The concept of migra t ion  f a c e s  t h e  same d i f f i c u l t i e s .  From t h e  con- 
t inuous  locomotion of human be ings ,  t o  p i ck  ou t  some moves a s  more d e f i n i -  
t i v e  than  o t h e r s  r e f l e c t s  t h e  concern of b u r e a u c r a t s  t o  a t t a c h  people t o  
domici les  where they  can b e  r e g i s t e r e d ,  enumerated, taxed ,  d r a f t e d  and 
watched. A vagrant  -- a person wi thout  a  domic i le  -- g ives  t r o u b l e  not  
only to the police but also to definitions of migration. Are gypsies 
migrants? The crisp definitions and statistics essential to an answer 
emerged with the consolidation of national states and state bureaucracies. 
With'rare exceptions, both practical definitions and available evidence 
concerning migration state the answers to some combination of these three 
questions: 
1. Who lives here now? -
2. Where did they live - then?
3. Who else lived here then? 
A single enumeration of the population can produce answers to the first 
two questions. The third question requires enumerations at more than 
one point in time. But all three can be answered within a single adminis- 
trative unit. Only rarely do we find an answer to the fourth obvious ques- 
tion in the series: Where do they live - now? That requires two difficult 
operations: looking in several places, and tracing people forward in time. 
Counts of migration therefore consist mainly of comparisons, one.place 
at a time, a) between the answers to questions 1 and 2; b) among the 
answers to ques'tions.1, 2 and 3 . *  
All the elements -- who, where, when -- are problematic. All are 
quite vulnerable to the administrative vagraries which vexed Oskar 
Morgenstern. ''Who" may refer to heads of households, workers, citizens, 
legal residents or everyone on hand. ''Where" may mean in some particular 
dwelling, in some particular parish, or in some much larger administrative 
unit. "When" is most elusive of all. For the innocent theorist, to live 
somewhere sometime implies a durable attachment to the place. For the 
actual~collector of the information, however, physical presence on census 
day, or mere registry as an inhabitant, whether the person is physically 
present or not, is commonly all that matters. As a consequence, our con- 
ceptions of migration and our evidence concerning it both emphasize 
changes of legal domicile and crossings of administrative boundaries. 
In order to make sense of the long-run changes in European migration 
patterns, we must therefore add social content to our measures and clas- 
sifications. Whatever else migration is about, it is about moves which 
are relatively long and relatively definitive. Figure 1 presents a sim- 
ple classification scheme based on length and definitiveness. It classifies 
moves of individuals, households-or other social units; Its first dimen- 
sion is distance; there we have the choice of simple geographic distance, . 
time, expense, cultural distance, or some combination of them. Below 
some minimum distance, no move (however definitive) constitutes migration. 
Although any such minimum is arbitrary, we are unlikely ever to consider 
a move from one house to the house next door to qualify as migration. 
The.ser2ond dimension is the extent of the social unit's break with 
the area of origin. At the one extreme lie moves which entail no breaking 
of social ties; at -the other, the complete rupture of ties at the move's 
place of origin. Below some minimum amount of rupture, no move (however 
distant) constitutes migration. Such a minimum requirement corresponds 
readily to our intuitive reluctance to consider a long round-the-world 
voyage as migration; to our intuitions, the maintenance of a household 
"back home" says that too few ties have been broken. 
Given the two dimensions, most moves -- a walk around the block, a 
vacation trip to London, the daily trip to the factory and back -- involve 
too little distance and/or too little break with the place of origin to 
count as migration at all. The diagram labels those moves "mobility". It 
includes them to emphasize.that the line between mobility and migration is 
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a r b i t r a r y .  The po in t  may be obvious, bu t  i t  i s  important. For example, 
h i s t o r i a n s  working wi th  v i l l a g e  populat ion r e g i s t e r s  f requent ly  encounter 
ind iv idua l s  who kept  t h e  same l e g a l  domicile  f o r  years  while working i n  
d i s t a n t  cit ies;  be fo re  ca lcu la t ing  migra t ion  r a t e s  and descr ib ing t h e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  of t h e  v i l l a g e ' s  " res ident"  populat ion,  they must decide 
on which s i d e  of t h e  curved l i n e  t o  put  those  vagrant  individuals .  
Figure 1: Four Standard Migration P a t t e r n s  
Local, C i rcu la r ,  Chain and Career Migration 
The most i n t e r e s t i n g  d i s t i n c t i o n s  appear wi th in  the  shaded migration 
area .  They depend on t h e  s o c i a l  organiza t ion  of t h e  move i n  quest ion.  
" ~ o c a l  migrat ion s h i f t s  an individual  o r  household wi th in  a . geographically . 
contiguous market -- a labor market, a land market, or perhaps a marriage 
market. In local migration the distance moved is small by definition; 
the extent of break with the place of origin is also likely to be small. 
On the whole, the migrant is already quite familiar with the destination 
before making the move; he or she therefore has relatively little learning 
of a new environment to do after the move. 
Take ~ ~ ~ s a l a - ~ z s ,  an ,agricultural parish near Uppsila, Sweden for an 
example.. There, the continuous population registers make it possible to 
pinpoint different types of moves from 1881 to 1885. There were many moves. 
Calculated as rates per year per hundred persons who could have moved, 
the figures (Eriksson & Rogers 1973: 67) are: 
moves into or out of the parish 
moves within the parish 
movers into or out of the parish 
movers within the parish 
In the ordinary year of 1882, in a parish whose population remained a little 
under 500, 76 in-migrants arrived, 93 people left the parish, and 27 more 
moved within the parish. If the parish boundary is the line between "local 
mobility" and "migration", migrants were equal to about a third of the 
total population. In 1883, the figure went up to about two-fifths. Yet 
the occupational structure remained fairly constant, no devastating social 
change occurred, and the great bulk of the migrants moved to or from other 
parishes in the immediate vicinity. Although many migrants tried their 
hands in Uppsala or Stockholm at one time or another, Eriksson and Rogers 
suggest that the structure of local agriculture accounted for most of the 
movement : 
Large e s t a t e s  requi red  h i red  labor  and a Iiindless p r o l e t a r i a t  quickly 
developed, which i n  t u r n  cont r ibuted  t o  a  higher r a t e  of movement. 
Landless and almost e n t i r e l y  r e s t r i c t e d  t o  a g r i c u l t u r a l  occupations 
these  groups had l i t t l e  chance f o r  s o c i a l  advancement u n t i l  the  
breakthrough of indus t ry ,  bringing changes i n  s o c i e t y  and new oppor- 
t u n i t i e s  (Eriksson & Rogers 1973: 79). 
The l o c a l  migrat ion r a t e s  f o r  t h i s  one well-studied Swedish p a r i s h  were 
probably above average f o r  Europe a s  a  whole. Yet where h i red  labor  and 
a l and less  p r o l e t a r i a t  prevai led ,  l o c a l  migrat ion r a t e s  on t h e  same order  
seem t o  have been common. 
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"Circular" migrat ion takes  a s o c i a l  u n i t  t o  a  d e s t i n a t i o n  through a 
s e t  of arrangements which r e t u r n s  i t  t o  t h e  o r i g i n  a f t e r  a  well-defined in- 
t e r v a l .  Seasonal work on ha rves t s ,  p a s t o r a l  transhumance, t h e  sending of 
young people i n t o  domestic s e r v i c e  before  they marry and the  c i r c u i t s  of 
Alpine v i l l a g e r s  who served long years  i n  t h e  lowlands a s  schoolteachers,  
s o l d i e r s  o r  craftsmen before  t h e i r  long-planned r e t u r n  t o  t h e  mountains 
with the  accumulated c a p i t a l  a l l  r ep resen t  v a r i a n t s  of c i r c u l a r  migration. 
Today many Turks, Algerians,  West Indians,  Spaniards and Portuguese a r e  
t r ave l ing  i n  s i m i l a r  circiLGs. 
I n  the  nineteenth-century Limousin, f o r  example, t h e r e  were a number 
of cantons i n  which a quar t e r ,  two-fif ths o r  even t h r e e - f i f t h s  of t h e  a d u l t  
males reported t h e i r  occupations a s  "mason!! (Corbin 1975: 197). That was 
only poss ib le  because each spr ing  thousands of men who worked on Limousin 
farms during t h e  winter  months walked off  t o  earn  money i n  cons t ruct ion  
elsewhere, and each f a l l  most of them re turned wi th  the  6ulk of t h e i r  
earnings hidden i n  t h e i r  napsacks. Taking a l l  t r ades  together ,  a t  mid- 
century some 50,000 Limousins joined each year's circular migration. In 
Paris, "mason" and "~imousin" were nearly synonymous. 
Because of their migratory regularity, the Limousins bore the nick- 
name Swallows. Although the road from Limoges to Paris was close to 200 
miles, before the railroad offered a cheap alternative hundreds of village 
bands trampgd most of it together each year. The famous mason-become- 
politico Martin Nadaud took his first trip in 1830, when he was fourteen. 
He, his father, and other masons from their village walked the roughly 
150 miles of back roads and woods to Orleans in four days before boarding 
their hired coaches for the last leg to Paris. Once in Paris, the Limousin 
masons gathered for the construction season in cheap, dingy rooming houses 
run by their countrymen. During the great Parisian workers' insurrection 
of June 1848, 575 masons were among the roughly 11,600 people arrested and 
charged. Of those 575 masons, 246 were from northernrilimousin. The great 
bulk of them lived in central-city lodging houses, especially in the narrow 
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streets behind the Hotel de Ville. The Limousin masons were at once 
counetymen, migrants and active participants in Parisian life. 
"Chain" migration is our third type. Chain migration moves sets of 
related individuals of households from one place es another via a set of 
social arrangements in which people at the destination provide aid, infor- 
mation and encouragement to new migrants. Such arrangements tend to pro- 
duce a considerable proportion of experimental moves and a large backflow 
to the piLAce of origin. At the destination, they also tend to produce 
durable clusters of people linked by common origin. At the extreme, they 
form urban villages. In Medival and Renaissance Europe, cities often per- 
mitted or even required these clusters of people to organize'as "nations" 
sharing well-defined privileges and bearing collective responsibility for 
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the policing and welfare of their members. In those cities,'migrants of 
one nationality or another fequently established a quasi-monopoly of some 
particular trade. In sixteenth-century Rome, for example, the most suc- 
cessful courtesans were Spanish. The fact was so well known that in 1592 
other members of "the Spanish nation", no doubt wishing their reputation 
to rest on other accompishments, formally petitioned Pope Clement VIII to 
banish Spanish courtesans from Rome (Delumeau 1957: I, 201). To this day, 
the old university of Uppsala is organized in Nations representing the major 
provinces of Sweden. But most chain migrants have formed and reformed their 
communities without the benefit of such formal recognition of their com- 
mon orggin. When the chain works well as a transmission belt, it continuesP 
to stretch from origin to destination until no members are left at the 
origin. 
In the 1950i; and 1960s, for example, chain migration was emptying 
Tierra de Campos, a Castillian agricultural region of some 120,000 people 
in 178 small settlements. In one sample of out-migrants interrogated by 
Victor Perez Dfaz, 60 percent of the migrants already knew someone at the 
destination before they left home. Once departed, the migrants sent back 
letters and remittances at an impressive rate: a reported average of 40 
letters and 8,000 pesetas per year (Perez Dfaz 1971: 148-153). In general, 
the more distant and costly the migration, the more people rely on others- 
at the destination to ease the way. The extreme -- for the case of Tierra 
de Campos and for the migration of poor Europeans in general -- is over- 
seas migration, where the great majority of moves belong to well-defined 
chains. 
"Career" migration, finally, has persons or hbuseholds making more or 
less definitive moves in response to opportunities to change position within 
or among large structures: organized trades, firms, governments, mercantile 
networks, armies and the like. If there is a circuit; it is not based on 
the social bonds at the migrant's place of origin, but on the logic of the 
large structure itself. If people within the migrant mass help and en- 
courage each other, they are generally colleagues, not neighbors~or kins- 
men. The migrations of scientists, technicians, military officers, priests 
and bureaucrats commonly fall into this type rather'than into local, cir- 
cular or chain migration. 
Sixteenth-century migrants tcj canterbury and other towns of Kent,, according 
to Peter Clark, consisted maifily of two groups: poor people from the 
countryside who moved relatively long distances to take up unskilled urban 
work, and more comzortable people from other towns and the nearby country- 
side who entered crafts and other fairly skilled urban employment. Both 
of these groups probably consisted chiefly of chain migrants. But with 
the economic expansion of the sixteenth century, another category was be- 
coming more important: itinerant professionals, craftsmen and other 
specialists. As Clark puts it: 
If the itinerant craftsmen or specialist had also been a medieval 
figure the expansion of this kind of professional migration in the 
sixteenth century in response to the needs of an increasingly 
sophisticated social and economic order had a new, radical importance 
-- both in numbers and impact. The growth of internal trade entailed 
a major increase in the numbers of pedlars, chapmen and other itinerant 
retailers with their own trade routes across countries (~lark.1972: 
146) . 
In the same general category were clergymen seeking new posts. None of 
those peoele were undergoing the sorts of station-to-station transfers 
which became the common experience of employees tn big twentieth-century 
organizations. Yet as compared with the other migrants to Kentish towns 
they were clearly migrating in response to career opportunities. 
The types overlap. They sometimes change from one to another. For 
example, most systems of circular migration leave a residue of migrants at 
the destination. The stayers include both successful people who make a 
good thing of mediating between their mobile countrymen and the local 
population, and failures who die before accumulating the capital to go 
back home. A circular system with a rising residue eventually becomes a 
chain. In migration from the high Alps, for example, the peddler-migrants 
who made good tended to establikh shops in lowland towns, and to provide 
the contacts for subsequent migrants from the uplands (Merlin 1971: 34). 
In another overlap, local migration systems sometimes provide the 
basis for long-distance chain migration. One of the most spectacular 
examples is the little local system of labor migration around seveneeenth 
century Tourouvre-au-Perche~ It extended into the long chain which, 
through transatlantic migration, North American propagation, and subsequent 
migration within Canada, gave ancestors'to much of Quebec's contemporary 
population. Some 300 migrants from that small region left for Canada in 
the seventeenth century, especially toward 1650. Labor recruiters encour- 
aged the move to Quebec, and drew a disproportionate number of men in their 
twenties. Despite the unblanced sex ratio, the migrants married and bore 
children in exceptional numbers. Some migrated as families, some sent 
later for families already begun in France, some returned to marry in the 
~egion of Tourouvre, and almost all the rest married in Canada soon after 
arrival (Charbonneau 1970). 
Despite the overlap, the systems have some characteristic differences. 
On the whole, circular migration is very sex-selective: practically all- 
male practically all-female, depending on the occupation at the destination. 
Ch'ain migration's sex-selectivity tends to change over time. One typical 
arrangement is for single males to make up the vanguard, with single females 
and then whole families joining them later. Local and career migration, in 
contrast, are not generally very selective by sex; either whole households 
migrate or the stream comprises both men-and women. 
The geographic pattern also variesfrom one type to another. Chain 
migration tends to link a particular origin with no more than a handful of 
possible destinations. But those destinations are often at a considerable 
distance. Circular migration may do the same thing, but it is somewhat 
more likely to disperse the available workers .among a number of opportun- 
ities. Local migration involves many destinations within a circumscribed 
range. Career migration, finally, tends to spread people far and wide. 
The geographic differences suggest . . the' following grouping of the migration 
patterns : 
SUPPLY OF RELEVANT SKILLS 
General. , Special 
High chain circular 
'COST.OF INFORMATION 
ABOUT OPPORTUNITIES Low local - career 
Chain and circular migration are ways of combatting high costs of informa- 
tion about opportunities for employment, proprietorship, and other desired 
ends. Circular and career migration respond to situations in which the 
skills the migrants exercise are not generally available -- because they 
are hard to learn, because the migrants have monopolfied them, or because 
other people are unwilling to work at them. Thus as the cost of information 
about job opportunities declines, chain and circular migration give way to 
local and career migration. But to the extent that all job skills are 
unevenly distributed, circular and career migration tend to supplant chain 
and local migration. 
The rough classification of migration into local, circular, chain 
and career does not exhaust the significant distinctions one might make. 
For example, it catches quite imperfectly the important difference between 
individual and collective migration; although on the whole chain and circular 
migration less frequently involve single individuals than do local and 
career migration, there are individual and collective versions of all four 
types. The classification does not embody the distinction between forced 
and voluntary migration; it therefore deals awkwardly with the expulsion 
of the Huguenots from France and the flight of Jews from eastern European 
pogroms. Since it concentrates on particular moves, it does not easily 
separate two rather different relationships between a major city and its 
hinterland: the rare pattern in which migrants come directly to the city 
from the distant countryside, and the common pattern in which country people 
move to nearby small towns, small town people move to large towns, and so 
on step by step to the metropolis. The classification into local, circular, 
chain and career migrations separates some significantly different social 
arrangements from each other, but it does not make all the distinctions 
one might wish to employ. 
The sorts of administratively produced evidence we have concerning 
European migration do not permit us to distinguish easily among local, 
circular, chain and career migration. To do so, one needs life histories, 
detailed accounts of intentions and social relations at the time of moves, 
or both. Records of official changes of domicile yield the former with 
great difficulty, and the latter not at all. On the basis of the scattered 
evidence available, nevertheless, it seems safe to say that in the age of 
industrialization the general character of European migration shifted 
from the lower left to the upper right of our diagram: away from local and 
short-distance circular migration, toward lqnger-distance, idre definitive 
chain and career migration. It also seems safe to say that the pace of 
migration changed much less than its character. The history of Europe 
shows us not so much periods of immobility and mobility as decisive shifts 
among types of mobility. 
The Great Flows 
William McNeill has portrayed the repeated sweeps of conquering 
bands across the continent. He has also recounted the less dramatic, but 
no less momentous, flows of agricultural settlers into the.continentVs 
emptier spaces. Before the last millennium, large-scale movements of armed 
men and tribute-takers set the rhythm of European political history. Armed 
men and tribute-takers have thrived into our own time, but on the whole 
they have fixed themselves in space, reduced the scale and duration of 
their movements, and worked harder and harder at controlling the flows of 
people and goods into and out of their own fixed territories. Within 
Europe, long-distance flows of agricultural settlers continued, although 
their relative volume seems to have declined irregularly with the approach 
of our own time. 
The last massive migration of agricultural workers within Europe 
was the Medieval flow of German-speakers into the East and South of the 
continent. That flow continued past 1500. But by then its volume had 
greatly diminished. By that time German-speaking migrants consisted 
mainly of one variety or another of conqueror: officials, managers, merchants 
and landlords. , The seventeenth- and eighteenth-century expansion of the 
Prussian state formally incorporated a number of eastern German enclaves 
and took in a good deal of predominantly Slavic population. It did not, 
however, produce movements of population comparable to those of three or 
four centuries earlier. Despite Frederick the Great's strenuous efforts 
at settlement, for example, Silesia remained predominantly Polish-speaking. 
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Further south, the AUS triay'also sought to settle German speakers to their 
east by such straightforward devices as dispossessing the Czech landlords 
of Moravia. Although such planned migrations were of the greatest political 
importance, the numbers involved were relatively small. Indeed, they bucked 
the long-range trend, which was for Slavic-speakers, given weight by their 
generally higher levels of natural increase, to push westward into areas 
earlier occupied by Finns, Swedes and Germans. On either side of the 
linguistic frontier, massive long-distance rural-to-rural migration became. 
less prevalent after 1500. 
Long-distance moves of workers into non-agricultural employment are 
a different matter. They accelerated some.two hundred years ago, and 
have remained important since then. The migration.of Poles into the mine- ' 
fields of western Germany and eastern France and the rush of Irishmen to 
Liverpool and London illustrate the importance of long-distance migration L 
within industrial Europe. Contrary to first impressions, few of these 
long-distance migrants moved directly from farm to factory. For.the most 
part, the farmers who moved to cities found low-level employment in services 
and commerce. The apparent exceptions were commonly small-town artisans 
or rural industrial workers rather than peasants'or farm laborers. Indeed, 
over the last two centuries the most important single category of urban 
employment for rural-to-urbiln migrants within Europe has most likely been 
domestic service, Only an undue concentration on males and on manufacturing 
has obscured that fact. 
During the period of swift natural increase from the mid-eighteenth 
century to the end of the nineteenth, Europe also sent millions of its 
residents to the agricultural and industrial areas of the Americas and of 
Oceania. The great flows of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries followed 
smaller but still important migratory movements which accompanied European 
colonial expansion during the three previous centuries. In this great 
overseas migration, millions of rural Europeans did migrate to farms. -
French migrants peopled rural Quebec as well as Quebec City and Montreal. 
Portuguese emigrants became Brazilian farmers as well as residents of sag 
Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Later, more than two million Germans and Scandi- 
navians sailed to America. There, many of them settled on frontier farms. 
Altogether, Europe's net migration from 1800 to World War I was on 
the order of fifty million persons. Given the frequent returns of chain 
migrants, a much larger number must have made the trip at one time or 
another. Since a return rate of 30 percent is plausible, the true number 
could easily be 65 million sometime emigrants. Over half of all European 
emigrants in that period went to the United States. 
The British Isles -- especially Ireland -- were the champion exporters 
of humankind, and the chief purveyors to America. About three-quarters of 
nineteenth-century emigrants from Britain went to North America. As a 
result, at least a third of all American immigrants in that century were 
native speakers of English. Nevertheless, Germany, Greece, Italy and the 
Scandinavian countries all became major sources of overseas migrants at 
some time during the nineteenth century. 
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One of the best-documented cases is De.nmark.) With a total population 
in the range of two million, Denmark sent over 300,000 migrants overseas 
between 1840 and 1914 (Hvidt 1975: 9). Over 90 percent went to North 
America. Within that small country, rates of emigration differed drama- 
tically from one district to another. On the whole, they were much higher 
in the southeast than elsewhere. More generally, urban areas sent migrants 
at a significantly higher pace than rural areas did. Yet where urban 
growth and industrialization were vigorous, relatively little emigration 
occurred. 
The ideal origin for Danish emigrants seems to have been the stagnant 
town in which underemployed long-term migrants from nearby rural areas were 
accumulating. Landless laborers and servants were especially good prospects 
for emigration. Kristian Hvidt quotes a letter describing the situation 
on the high-migration island of Bornholm: 
The Bornholm farmers pay their small-holding laborers much 
too poorly in relation to the prices of necessities. But 
the huge number of immigrating Swedes rules out a rise in 
wages. An ordinary laborer who is not a craftsman has often 
only the choice between America or the poorhouse (Hvidt 1975: 129). 
Chain migration was the predominant pattern among the 300,000 Danes who 
left Denmark. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, around a quarter 
of all Danish migrants to the United States came on steamship tickets 
prepaid by migrants already in America. (The comparable-figures for Norway 
and Sweden run from 40 to 50 percent.) "Letters, money, and prepaid tickets . 
came in a constant stream, the volume of which would quite likely surprise 
most people." writes Hvidt, 
since the emigrants were generally believed to have formed 
the poorest part of the population and to have been charac- 
terized by intellectual narrowness and insbfficient education. 
Improved economic conditions in the United States combined 
with the emotional longings inherent in emigration furthered 
both letter writing and sending tickets home. These personal 
contacts with the Old Country may well be sufficient expla- 
nation of why mass emigration accelerated whenever economic 
conditions permitted (Hvidt 1975: 194). 
Indeed, it was partly because they were poor and uneducated that the Danish 
emigrants relied on their compatriots for aid, encouragement and information 
in the long migration to America. 
In the period after World War I, with declining European rates of 
natural increase and rising American resistance to immigration, the pace 
of European emigration diminished. Nevertheless, Canada, Argentina, Brazil, 
Australia and New Zealand continued to receive large numbers of European 
migrants. In that period, as Table 1 shows, the British Isles regained the 
predominance they had lost to Italy during the period 1891 to 1920. Poorer 
areas of the British Isles, such as the declining Welsh mining region, sent 
their surplus labor overseas in the company of a smaller number of highly- 
educated people from all over Britain. Since the table deals only with the 
total number of overseas emigrants, it conceals an important counter- 
current: while the poor areas of Northwestern Europe continued to send 
migrants overseas, the more prosperous areas began to bring in migrants from 
elsewhere in Europe. 
Table 1. 
Percent of All European Overseas Emigrants Leaving from Selected 
Countries, 1846-1963. 
PERIOD 
COUNTRIES 1846-90 1891-1920 - .  1921-39' 1946-63 
British Isles 47.9 17.7 29.0 27.7 
Germany 20.2 3.4 9.8 15.7. 
Sweden, Denmark, 
Norway 
France, Switzerland, 4.2 1.5 2.5 14.9 
Netherlands 
Italy 8.2 27'.0. 18.6 19.0 
Austria, Hungary, 
Czechoslovzkia 
Russia, Poland, 2.1 13.0 12.0 ? 
Lithuania, Estonia, 
Finland 
Spain, Portugal 6.9 15.3 15.0 12.1 
Total Emigrants from. 376 9 10 366 .. 585 
Europe per year (x 1,000) 
Source: Calculated from Kosinski 1970: 57. 
The figures describe gross migration, not net loss through migration. 
Boundaries as of the 1960s apply to all periods. 
Since World War 11, Northwestern Europe has become an even more 
active importer of migrants. Yugoslavia, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Ireland, 
Turkey became major suppliers to the highly industrialized regions of 
Europe. This last shift has its ironies: we see the nations which peopled 
the restof the western world drawing their unskilled labor from poor 
immigrants, and fretting about the disruption such migrations may cause. 
The Switzerland which long disposed of its surplus men as mercenaries in 
European armies now has a sixth of its population foreign-born. The Great 
Britain which flooded America with English-speaking fami-lies now debates 
the desirability of its 5 percent born elsewhere. According to Stephen 
Castles and Godula Kosack, France, West Germany, Switzerland and Great 
BrTtain, among others, have come to rely almost entirely on foreigners to 
do their dirty work. Yet they have proved quite hostile to granting the 
newcomers a permanent stake in their host countries. Xenophobia is nothing 
new. But the backing it has received from West European states in recent 
.years is unusual. 
The Impacts of War and Politics 
The most dramatic twentieth-century change in European migration 
patterns was:.not the Northwest's shift from export-to inport of migrants. 
It was the expanding role of political pressures and political controls. 
Politics impinged on migration in three distinct ways: through war, through 
deliberate relocation of ethnic minorities, and through stringent national 
controls over immigration and emigration. 
During the twentieth century, in more senses than one, war became 
the prime mover. Earlier, such continental conflicts as the Thirty Years' 
War and the Napoleonic Wars had produced hordes of refugees. They also 
produced some long-term displacement of population away from the war zones. 
But World Wars I and I1 produced incomparably greater migratory currents in 
Europe. According to Eugene Kulischer's compilation (Kulischer 1948: 
248-249), the largest flows witkin Europe and the adjacent sections of 
Asia from 1918 to 1939 were: 
1.2 million Greeks to Greece from Turkey (1922-1923) 
1.15 million Russians to Europe outside the Soviet Union (1918-1922) 
1.1 million repatriated from Russia to Poland (1918-1925) 
900 thousand Poles from former Russian and Austrian Poland 
to former German Poland (1918-1921) 
700 thousand Germans from Western Poland, Danzig and Memel 
to Germany (1918-1925) 
Only then do we arrive at migratory streams-in which the war and the peace 
settlement did not play a large, direct part:.the estimated 650 thousand 
Italians who went from Italy to France over the 21 years from 1919 to 1939, 
and the estimated 450 thousand Poles who made the move to France over the 
same period. (These are net figures; according to Poltsh statistics, 
for example, 622 thousand Poles went to France from 1919 through 1939, 
but 200 thousand returned to Poland, for a net of 422 thousand migrants: 
These numbers are large. They are, however, modest compared to the 
figures for World War I1 and its aftermath. To again take the leaders 
in Kulischer's compilation (Kulischer 1948: 302-304): 
6 million Reich Germans from New Poland to Germany (1944-1947) 
5 million Jews from Germany to extermination camps in Poland 
and elsewhere (1940-1944) 
4 million Reich Germans from the Soviet Zone to the U.S. and' 
British Zones (1945-1946) 
3 million Poles from Old Poland to New Poland (1945-1947) 
2.7 million ethnic Germans from Czechoslovakia to Germany 
and Austria (1945-1946) 
1.8 million Czechs and Slovaks from Inner Czechoslovakia to the 
former Sudetenland (1946-1947) 
1 million ethnic Germans from Old Poland to Germany (1944-1945) 
The list goes on. However approximate these figures are, and however much 
double-counting they include, they portray World War I1 and -- especially -- 
the postwar settlement as one o f  the greatest demographic whirlwinds ever 
to sweep the earth. 
Some of these migrants fled from war zones. Many more of them 
moved at the behest of governments. On the whole, the refugees contributed 
to the diversity of population at their destinations. When states 
deliberately relocated people, however, they tended to homogenize the 
language and culture of the people within any particular set of national 
boundaries. The net effect of the migrations surrounding the two world 
wars was therefore to homogenize nation-states and probably to increase 
their capacity for nationalism. 
Heightened nationalism and the recurrent labor shortages of the 
richer European countries have combined to produce a contradictory situation. 
On the one hand, such countries as Switzerland, West Germany and France 
have become-sorely dependent on poorer countries for supplies of unskilled 
labor. On the other hand, those same countries and their neighbors have 
greatly increased their controls over immigration and emigration. There is, 
to be sure, a sharp difference between eastern and western Europe in those 
regards. On the whole, the richer western European countries have encouraged 
circular migration of low-wage workers from elsewhere but have made it 
difficult for them to become long-time residents and, especially, to acquire 
citizenship. The Soviet Union and other Communist states have simply made 
all forms of entry and exit difficult. 
The last five centuries of European long-distance migration show us 
three major factors at work: 1) a changing . . geographic distribution of 
opportunities for employment, 2) alterations of regional differentials in 
natural increase, 3) actions and policies of national states -- notably 
making war, controlling migration and.deliberately recruiting, expelling 
or relocating specific ethnic and religious groups. The first. two factors 
have shaped migration throughout the five hundred years: To explain why 
and how they worked is to trace out the expansion of capitalism, the prole- 
tarianization of the European population as a whole, the march of urbani- 
zation and industrialization. The third factor -- actions and policies of 
national states -- gained importance as the five centuries wore on. By the 
twentieth century, wars and their settlements rivaled the interplay of 
employment and natural increase as incentives to long-distance migration. 
The Local Flows 
No one has given us a comprehensive statistical atlas of long- 
distance migration within, from and to the European continent. That 
would be a useful enterprise. But at least the existence and broad direc- 
tions of the long-distance flows are well known. In the present state of 
our knowledge, local migration provides more puzzles. 
Recent work on the historical demography of Europe has experienced 
a nice :dialectic. The fastidious methods for reconstructing pre-census 
demographic characteristics developed by such scholars as Louis Henry 
and E.A. Wrigley sometimes assume, and always apply more easily to, rela- 
tively immobile populations. Yet one of the most impressive and consistent 
findings of the historical demographers has been the high level of local 
mobility among pre-industrial European people. In studies of eighteenth- 
century agricultural villages, it is not unusual to find over a tenth of 
the population making a significant change of residence each year. If the 
sheer frequency of moves (rather than the distance moved) is the criterion, 
it is not at all clear that industrialization produced a major increase in 
the European population's mobility. 
The findings coming in jar our preconceptions concerning the settled 
peasant world industrialization is supposed to have broken up. Still, the 
idea of a settled peasant world is not so much wrong as incomplete. Let 
US consider "peasants" to be members of households whose major activity 
is farming, households which produce a major share of the goods and services 
they consume, which exercise substantial control over the land they farm, 
and which supply the major part of their labor requirements from their own 
energies. If that is what we mean by peasants, a majority of the European 
population was probably peasant until late in the eighteenth century. The 
true peasant population was, so far as we know, relatively immobile. 
But the extrapolation of peasant immobility to the European popu- 
lation as a whole errs in several ways. A substantial minority of the 
population was - not peasant. From the later eighteenth century, the non- 
peasants were probably a majority. Among the non-peasants were significant 
groups of traders and artisans for whom movement was a way of life. Less 
obvious among them was a large, growing mass of landless laborers. (To take 
one of the extreme cases, Gregory King estimated for the England of 1688 
that only 350 thousand of the 1.2 million families in agricluture lived 
from their own land: Pollard & Crossley 1968: 154.) 
The landless and land-poor moved frequently, sometimes seasonally, 
in response to the demand for wage-labor. As Paul Slack points out, the 
seventeenth century English local authorities regularly whipped the 
I I vagrantsf' who were multiplying in the countryside and sent them back to 
their parishes of origin. But those "vagrants" were only a minority of 
the many landless laborers then on the roads. They were the ones who had 
failed to find work. As enclosures and population growth swelled the 
numbers of people w h ~  had no place on the land in their home villages, 
many migrated in search of employment elsewhere. Local authorities 
treated them ambivalently: welcoming.their labor if the parish needed it 
and could control it, but striving to make sure the wanderers gained no 
claims on parish welfare funds. Hence the whip. 
Contrary to ideas linking high mobility to industrialization, 
however, the spread of rural industry seems to have helped the landless 
to settle down. It meant they could piece together starvation wages from 
industrial and agricultural work in their own villages. In his rich study 
of the Zurich uplands during early industrialization, Rudolf Braun shows 
us exactly that fixing of the proletarian population in place via cottage 
industry. Whereas the surplus hands of previous generations had walked 
kind of 
off to military careers, domestic service or another/unskilled work else- 
where, the villagers of the eighteenth century began to stay on the land, 
spinning and weaving. 
In the Leicestershire village of Shepshed, where cottage industry 
gre~~considerably during the eighteenth century: 
In pre-industrial Shepshed just 46 percent of the families 
entering the observation had been married in the parish whereas 
during industrialization the proportion of parochial marriage 
rose so that after 1810 76.9 of all families had been married 
in the village church (Levine 1976: 72). 
As opportunities for industrial employment expanded in Shepshed, more 
people lived out their lives in the parish, and saw their children do the 
same. 
Some true peasant households were also quite mobile. It is doubt- 
ful that the majority of European peasant households owned the bulk of 
the land they farmed before some time in the nineteenth century. Most 
were tenants of one type or another. Tenancy meant turnover. Annual, 
quinquennial or even nine-year leases brought the significant possibility 
of a move when the lease expired. The scattered studies in historical 
demography which have been able to make the essential distinctions with 
respect to control of land have found tenants migrating to and from villages 
in significant numbers. During the nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
"rural exodus", landless laborers were generally the first to leave the 
countryside, tenants next, and owners quite slow to depart. 
Demographic Stimuli to Migration 
In addition to the effects of tenancy and employment, old-regime 
demographic conditions provided their own spurs to migration. The best- 
known of those demographic conditions was the enormous death rate in cities. 
The rates were high enough that before the nineteenth century large cities 
,: 
could only maintain their populations through substantial in-migration, 
and could only grow through massive recruitment of outsiders. For example, 
in the little North Sea port of Husum from 1765 to 1804 the crude birth 
rate was about 26.6 and the crude death rate about 28.9, for a natural 
decrease of about 2.3 persons per thousand per year. That was true despite 
an age structure favorable to low mortality. In the forty years after 1804, 
by contrast, the crude birth rate rose a trifle to 27.1, while the crude 
death rate declined to 24.8. That produced a natural increase of about, 
2.3 per thousand (computed from Momsen 1969: 58, 66). In actual numbers, 




POPULATION BIRTHS - NET 
CHANGE DEATHS MIGRATION 
Thus in the early nineteenth century natural increase more than supplied 
Husum's need for new hands and a surplus migrated elsewhere. But in the 
eighteenth century the city had to bring in migrants simply to maintain 
its population. 
Husum and other small cities generally drew the bulk of their 
migrants from their immediate hinterlands. In most cases, a small city's 
radius of intensive attraction was no more than ten or fifteen miles (see 
Patten 1973). Before the rising natural increase of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, the supply of migrants behaved a good deal like the 
supply of food: cities consumed more than they produced; they drew the 
hard-won surplus from many surrounding communities, and thus affected 
those communities deeply; they drew more specialized supplies drom greater 
distances via other cities.; when they grew fast, that growth generated a 
demand which reverberated through more and more of the hinterland. 
Large cities drew on correspondingly larger areas of supply. In 
times of relatively rapid urban growth, such as significant parts of the 
sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, major cities drew their increments 
from vast hinterlands. London grew from about 400 thousand in 1650 to 
about 650 thousand a century later. That growth had a large impact on 
the food production of southern England. It also altered English migration 
systems, despite the fact that they were already centered in London. 
E.A. Wrigley speculates that in the high-growth century from 1650 to 1750 
a sixth of the entire adult population of England spent some part of their 
lives in London (Wrigley 1967: 49). The high-mortality metropolis 
stuffed itself with an entire country's demographic surplus. 
Urban natural decrease was not the only important demographic 
condition. In a time of.high, fluctuating fertility and high, unstable 
mortality, households which had relatively inelastic labor requirements 
often found their supply and demand badly matched. Artisans with an 
expensive stock in trade and peasants with fixed allotments of land, for 
instance, tended to develop a well-defined household division of labor 
by age, sex and marital status. They could only absorb an extra hand or 
do without one of the standard household members at great strain. Either 
the death of a mother or the survival of an extra child jostled a 
delicate equilibrium. In the short run, such households used migration 
to adjust the supply to the demand. Extra children migrated, temporarily 
or definitively, into domestic service,,armies, peddling. The household 
made up shortages by bringing in servants and/or kinsmen from elsewhere. 
A very high proportion of all individual migration before the twentieth 
century consisted of these transfers of labor among households. 
In quantitative terms, however, marriage and the termination of 
marriage were probably the most significant demographic spurs to migra- 
tion. Throughout the centuries, almost every European marriage has 
required at least one spouse to make a definitive change or residence. 
With some lags and exceptions due to co-residence with parents, the great 
majority have led to the formation of a new household in a new location. 
As nuptiality rose in the nineteenth century, the frequency of marriage- 
linked migration rose as well. The termination of marriages through 
divorce or death played a smaller part, but not a negligible one, in 
causing migration. To know whether its importance increased or decreased, 
we need not only to grasp the trends in the divorce rates, but also to 
balance off the migration-inducing effects of remarriages against the 
changing likelihood that a bereaved spouse will remain in the household 
she or he already occupies. We do not now.have the necessary evidence. 
My speculation is that the termination of marriages became a less important 
occasion for migration in Europe after the eighteenth century. 
Qualifications and Conclusions 
Over the five centuries or so we have been reviewing, most migrants 
have moved short distances. Most moves have responded'to demographic 
imbalances and changing employment opportunities. Both remained true 
during a nineteenth century of massive overseas migration. Both remained 
true during a twentieth century of major displacements by war. Further- 
more, local systems of migration often provided the bases of subsequent 
longer-range migration. That happened in circular migration systems 
which included cities; if opportunity rose in the city and declined in 
the countryside, the system started depositing a permanent residue of 
migrants in the city. It also happened in some essentially rural systems 
of labor migration to which an overseas destination became available: 
mobile agricultural workers in Deninark or Portugal found themselves working, 
in the company of their.compatriots, in New York or Toronto. The long-run 
trend of European migration ran from local and circular migration to 
chain and career migration. The average distances moved and the definitive- 
ness 0.f breaks with the place of origin both increased. But the continuities 
between the older and newer forms of migration were impressive. 
I have stressed the high mobility of European populations 
before the nineteenth century. I have'stressed it because it requires us 
to rethink the relationship between industrialization and mobility. If I 
have given the impression that nothing changed in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, however, that is wrong. The average distances of 
migration rose dramatically with large-scale industrialization. The 
unprecedented concentration of opportunities for employment in large 
cities oriented migration to those cities as never before. The growing 
power of national states impinged on twentieth-century migration through 
war and through deliberate controls over entries and exits. Those are 
novelties of the modem world. 
The high mobility of the pre-industrial world also requires some 
qualification. In general, the distances involved in rural migration or 
in migration to small cities were small. The bulk of the migrants to any 
locality typically came from within five or ten miles. Only larger cities 
regularly escaped from that rule. If we were to set a local labor 
market as the limit within which a move counts as "mobility" instead of 
11 migration", we would eliminate many of the extremely high rates of 
migration now coming in from demographic studies of pre-industrial 
European populations. The generalization would then read: before large- 
scale industrialization, rural labor markets were typically larger than 
a single village; they were often very active, especially where tenancy 
and/or wage labor prevailed; people moved frequently within those labor 
markets in response to demographic imbalances and shifting opportunities 
for livelihood. 
We might speculate, in fact, that despite all the reverence for 
the village European historians have developed, -the village, parish or 
commune, the fundamental local unit was larger than any of them. The area 
served by a single market has turned out to be the basic building block 
of traditional China (Skinner 1964, 1965). It defined the familiar world, 
the world of labor exchange, marriage, social mobility, local solidarity. 
Perhaps local market areas played a similar role in traditional Europe. 
The village, parish or commune then may have acquired importance only when 
national states required mutually exclusive administrative units which 
they could hold collectively responsible for taxation, conscription, road 
labor, the provision of food and the maintenance of public order. 
To the degree that we expand the definition of local mobility and 
become more stringent in our definition of migration, the era of large- 
scale industrialization and massive expansion of national states separates 
from the previous era. Long-distance, definitive migration did increase 
with industrialization and statemaking. Gross and net flows of migrants 
from rural to urban areas came to dominate the migration map as never 
before. As urban mortality declined, large rural-urban flows increasingly 
meant rapid urban growth. As rural natural increase declined, large rural- 
urban flows increasingly meant a depletion of the rural population. As 
national states grew, wars, peace settlements and national policies acted 
more and more powerfully as spurs and checks to migration. In the same 
era, local mobility did not increase significantly; in rural areas and 
small towns, it probably declined. 
The study of migration, then gets us into the homely adjustments 
ordinary Europeans made among their own life plans and the labor require- 
ments of the various organizations which had claims on them, or on which 
they had claims. Organizational structure, life plans, demography: changes 
in any of these three large elements eventually affect the character of the 
other two. Every major change in European organizational structure, life 
plans and demography has produced a durable transformation of European 
migration patterns. As time has gone one, national states have increasingly 
shaped and reshaped those patterns -- by deliberately controlling the 
poss ib i l i t i e s  of migration, by intentionally relocating ethnic minorities, 
and by destructively making war. The history of European migration is  
the history of European soc ia l  l i f e .  
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